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安吉县人民医院吸脂手术多少钱解放军第九八医院去痣多少钱HONG KONG — After a customer canceled a large order at the last minute, shares in Aixtron, a German high-tech company, sank fast. 香港——一个客户在最后时刻取消一笔大订单后,德国高科技公司爱思强(Aixtron)的股价迅速下滑。Months later, with the stock still reeling, a Chinese investor agreed to buy the company.数月后,在其股价依然萎靡不振之际,一个中国投资者同意买下公司。If only it were as simple as smart deal-making.如果此事真是这么简单,只是有人做出了明智的交易决策就好了。Financial filings and public statements indicate a web of relationships among the customer, the buyer and the Chinese state. 然而,根据提交给金融监管机构的文件及该公司公告显示,那名客户、买家与中国政府之间存在一个关系网。The links highlight the blurred lines between increasingly acquisitive Chinese companies and Beijing’s long-term industrial policy.这种关联,突显出胃口越来越大的中国企业和北京的长期产业政策之间颇为模糊的界限。The Aixtron case makes it very clear: It is not regular investment that is at work here, said Sebastian Heilmann, president of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a think tank based in Berlin. 爱思强的例子非常清晰地表明:这并不是常规的投资,在位于柏林的智库墨卡托中国研究中心(Mercator Institute for China Studies) 担任主管的韩天(Sebastian Heilmann)说。Instead, we see governmental-program capital working behind the scenes.相反,我们看到受政府控制的资本在幕后发挥着作用。Chinese leaders have made clear their intention of using state funds to acquire technological capabilities overseas and bring them home, and a series of purchases in recent years have highlighted that strategy.中国领导人表明了利用国家基金获取并引入海外技术能力的意图。近年来的一系列收购也突显了这一策略。That has led to questions about how to treat bids that cross between private investment and state-orchestrated takeovers. It has also fed into broader suspicions about the fate of the takeover targets, and whether national champions will ultimately be absorbed into the supply chain in China.这引发了一个问题:如果要约既涉及私人投资,又涉及由政府策划的收购,该如何对待?它还引发了关于收购目标未来命运如何的疑问,以及这些全国性龙头企业最终是否会被纳入中国供应链。Aixtron — one of a growing number of European businesses with cutting-edge technologies that have recently been targeted by a surge in Chinese overseas investment — provides a case study.近年来,随着中国在海外掀起投资热潮,越来越多拥有尖端技术的欧洲企业成了它的目标。作为其中一员,爱思强提供了一个可资研究的案例。A university spinoff, it employs hundreds of highly skilled engineers and has a decades-long history of making the advanced tools needed to make semiconductors. 作为大学衍生企业,爱思强雇用了数百名技能高超的工程师,在生产制造半导体所需先进工具方面拥有数十年经验。Its systems can deposit layers of chemicals just atoms thick that grow the crystals needed to make chips and light-emitting diodes.它的系统可以让化学品进行原子层沉积,由此生成的晶体是生产芯片和发光二极管的必需品。It was facing a broad slowdown in demand in 2015 when San’an Optoelectronics, based in the eastern Chinese city of Xiamen, canceled a large order at the last minute.在2015年,中国东部城市厦门的三安光电公司在最后时刻撤销了一笔大订单,这让爱思强遭遇了需求全面下降的状况。The decision sent Aixtron’s share price crashing. 这个决定导致爱思强的股价大幅下挫。By May of this year, it had agreed to sell itself to a Chinese investment fund, Fujian Grand Chip.到了今年5月,它接受了中国投资基金福建宏芯的收购要约。Yet in a twist that shows the conflicting interests that can lurk behind Chinese deals, San’an has a number of connections to Fujian Grand Chip, including a common investor and an existing financial relationship.不过,三安光电和福建宏芯有许多关联,其中牵涉到一名共同投资人和一种既有的财务关系。这显示了牵涉中国的交易背后,常常隐藏着利益冲突。Fujian Grand Chip is 51 percent controlled by Liu Zhendong, a businessman the Mercator Institute said most likely had government connections but was otherwise hard to track. 商人刘振东持有福建宏芯51%的股份。墨卡托中心称其极可能和政府有瓜葛,但这一点难以追查。The rest is held by Xiamen Bohao, a local government investment fund that itself has links to San’an.受控于当地政府的投资基金厦门灏持有其余的股份,它本身和三安光电有关。A financial filing showed that at the end of 2014, San’an owed Bohao 300 million renminbi, now worth about million. 提交给金融监管部门的一份文件显示,2014年底,三安光电欠厦门灏3亿元人民币,约合现在的4500万美元。The following year, another filing showed Bohao owed San’an 240 million renminbi. 次年另一份文件显示,厦门灏欠三安光电2.4亿元人民币。While there is no explanation given for the fund flows, they appear to be related to financing provided to San’an by Bohao.尽管文件未对上述资金流动做出说明,但它们似乎和厦门灏为三安光电提供资金持有关。There are other links as well. 二者之间还存在其他一些关联。Another state-run investment firm based in Xiamen holds stakes in both companies. 厦门的另一家国有投资企业在这两家公司里都持有股份。And a broader national investment fund is providing a loan facility, through a subsidiary, for the takeover of Aixtron while holding a stake in San’an.此外,一家业务范围更广的全国性投资基金在三安光电持有股份,正通过自己的子公司为收购爱思强提供贷款融通。Just three days after the Aixtron bid was announced, a new company was registered at an address in Quanzhou along the Taiwan Strait. 爱思强接到收购要约的消息宣布仅3天后,一家新公司在台湾海峡沿岸城市泉州注册成功。San’an was an investor in the company, and the address was the same as that listed by Fujian Grand Chip in its Aixtron offer.三安光电是该公司的一个投资方,而公司注册地址,与福建宏芯在收购爱思强的要约文件中列名的地址相同。The connections do not necessarily indicate wrongdoing. 这些关联不一定意味着存在违规行为。Still, they raise questions about the independence of Chinese companies that have been on a global high-tech spending binge.不过,它们会让人怀疑,正在全球范围内掀起高科技投资狂潮的中国企业是否具有独立性。It is the goal of Chinese outbound industrial policy programs to replace foreign technology leaders in the medium term — not just in China but also in global export markets, Mr Heilmann said.中国外向型产业政策规划的中期目标,是取代国外的科技龙头企业——不只是在中国,而且是在全球出口市场上,韩天称。He echoed the complaints of American and European officials, who say that while Chinese companies — including those backed by the state — are able to mount takeover bids for companies in the West, the opposite is not typically allowed within China.他的说法与美国及欧洲官员的抱怨相呼应。美欧官员称,虽然中国企业——包括那些有政府背景的企业——可以向西方企业发起收购要约,但如果换成西方企业收购中国企业,在中国则通常不被允许。The German economics ministry declined to comment on the Aixtron takeover. 德国经济部拒绝就爱思强收购案置评。Fujian Grand Chip, Bohao and Mr Liu declined to comment. 福建宏芯、厦门灏及刘振东也拒绝置评。San’an did not respond to a request for comment, but in a statement, Aixtron said San’an canceled its order because its specific qualification requirements were not achieved.三安光电未回复置评请求,但爱思强在一份声明中称,三安光电之所以取消订单,是因为特定的工艺要求无法得到满足。In an August conference call with analysts, Aixtron’s chief executive, Martin Goetzeler, said there no was current investment link between San’an and Fujian Grand Chip, a relationship that was first reported in the German magazine Capital.在8月份的面向分析师的电话会议上,爱思强首席执行官马丁#8226;格特策勒(Martin Goetzeler)说,三安光电和福建宏芯之间目前不存在投资关系——当初首先报道这种关系的是德国杂志《资本》(Capital)。Bids for companies like Aixtron reflect a shift in Chinese investment patterns that goes back a number of years.向爱思强这样的公司发出要约,反映出中国沿用多年的投资模式发生了转变。Chinese companies bearing checkbooks have generally been welcomed in Europe. 总体来说,手持票簿的中国公司是受到欧洲欢迎的。They have provided a source of fresh capital for ailing European enterprises, like the Swedish carmaker Volvo, the Italian tire maker Pirelli, the French resort operator Club Med, and the port in Piraeus, Greece.它们为境况不佳的欧洲企业,包括瑞典汽车制造商沃尔沃(Volvo)、意大利轮胎制造商倍耐力(Pirelli)、法国度假区运营商地中海俱乐部(Club Med)和希腊比雷埃夫斯的港口提供了新的资金来源。But deals over the past two years — which last year hit a record 20 billion euros, or .4 billion, according to a survey by Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute — have begun targeting leading-edge companies with crucial technologies and iconic brand names.但过去两年里的交易开始把目标对准拥有关键技术和标志性品牌的前沿企业。荣鼎集团(Rhodium Group)和墨卡托中心共同进行的一项调查显示,去年这类交易达到了创纪录的200亿欧元。Anxieties are perhaps most acute in Germany, which has had Aixtron and the well-known robotics company Kuka — whose technology is ubiquitous in German car factories — both go to Chinese bidders this year. 最紧张的大概是德国。今年,该国的爱思强和著名机器人公司库卡(Kuka)均被中国收购。库卡的技术在德国的汽车工厂里随处可见。Largely because of those two deals, Germany has become the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe thus far in 2016, according to the Mercator Institute.据墨卡托中心称,主要因为这两项交易,德国成了欧洲2016年迄今最大的中国投资接受国。In the ed States, a number of Chinese bids for chip companies have been undone by regulatory concerns. 在美国,中国公司对芯片企业发出的多项要约因监管机构的担忧而被迫取消。Regulators thwarted an overture by San’an for an American semiconductor company, and the Treasury Department’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the ed States is reviewing the Aixtron bid.监管机构叫停了三安对一家美国半导体公司提出的收购提议,美国财政部下属的美国外国投资委员会(Committee on Foreign Investment in the ed States)正在审查对爱思强提出的收购要约。By contrast, European laws give politicians few avenues to block acquisitions, though that has not stopped them from trying.相比之下,欧洲的法律几乎没给政界人士提供阻止收购的途径,但这并未妨碍他们尽力尝试。President Fran#231;ois Hollande of France has warned the Chinese hotel group Jin Jiang against trying to acquire a majority in the French hotel chain Accor. 法国总统弗朗索瓦#8226;奥朗德(Fran#231;ois Hollande)警告中国酒店集团锦江不要试图收购法国酒店连锁品牌雅高(Accor)的多数股份。And last month, Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain delayed approval of a nuclear power plant because of security concerns about Chinese companies involved. 上月,出于因涉及中国公司而产生的安全担忧,英国首相特丽莎#8231;梅(Theresa May)推迟了一个核电站项目的批准。(It has since been given the green light.)(该项目现在已经获批。)In Germany, the takeover of Kuka — frequently cited by politicians as emblematic of the country’s future economic development — has drawn particular attention. 在德国,收购库卡一事引起了特别的关注。政界人士常说此事象征着德国未来的经济发展。The economics ministry examined the takeover of the company by Midea Group in China, which aly owns 95 percent of Kuka shares, but eventually decided the deal did not meet the strict criteria for a formal review.该国经济部对中国美的集团收购库卡一事进行了调查,但最终断定交易未达到进行正式审核需满足的严格条件。美的现已拥有库卡95%的股份。Beyond politics, concerns also surround the origin of the money supporting Chinese bids.除政治外,持中国公司发出收购要约的资金的来源也引发了担忧。The Aixtron case, in particular, shows how difficult that can be.爱思强收购案尤其体现了其中的难度。Ultimately both San’an, the customer, and Fujian Grand Chip, the buyer, are recipients of government funds earmarked to help China build out its semiconductor capabilities. 无论是爱思强的客户三安,还是买家福建宏芯基金,从根本上都是政府资金的接受方,政府此举是为了帮助中国发展其半导体实力。While it’s not clear whether the two coordinated in any way, they are a product of a new approach Beijing has taken to develop its semiconductor industry.尽管尚不清楚这两家公司是否以某种方式进行了协调,北京为发展其半导体行业而采取了一种新方法,它们都是这一方法的产物。Previously, China’s government would dole out funds to several well-known state-owned companies. 以前,中国政府会将资金发放给多家著名的国有企业。Now those funds are being distributed through national and local investment funds, which give them out to, and through, smaller companies like Bohao and San’an.现在,这些资金通过中央和地方投资基金的形式发放,投资基金再将它们发放给灏和三安这种较小的公司,或是再经由它们进行发放。German companies have so far managed to stay ahead of China and other competitors in quality and technology, but there are growing concerns that Chinese companies are catching up.迄今为止,德国公司仍能在品质和技术上领先于中国和其他竞争对手,但民众对中国公司正在迎头赶上的担忧日渐加剧。A lot of people in Germany have massive concerns about Chinese companies taking over leading tech companies, said Daniel Bauer, a spokesman for SdK, a German investor-protection group. 很多德国人对中国公司收购德国著名科技公司非常担心,德国投资者保护组织SdK的发言人丹尼尔#8226;鲍尔(Daniel Bauer)说。People fear that foreign investors will just transfer the know-how and have no interest in keeping the facilities.人们担心外国投资者只会转移专业技术,无意于保留设施。 /201609/466790长兴县中医院激光点痣多少钱 Mobile phones can lose half of their value a month after being released, meaning they depreciate faster than cars, according to research.一项研究指出,手机在发布一个月后就会贬值一半,这意味着其贬值速度比汽车还快。While cars typically lose 20 per cent of their value a year after being driven off the forecourt, money-draining mobiles struggle to retain their value after a matter of months, a report by musicMagpie.co.uk has concluded.musicMagpie.co.uk网站的一份报告指出,新车在使用一年后通常会贬值20%。而投入大笔金额的手机大约在几个月之后就很难保留其价格了。Android phones tend to lose their value quicker than iPhones, with the exception of the iPhone 5 (16GB), which has seen 66 per cent wiped off its value in eight months, according to the website.该网站称,除了推出8个月后就贬值66%的内存16G的iPhone 5之外,安卓手机比苹果手机贬值更快。In the Android sector, the HTC One M9 lost 65 per cent of its value a month after being released, while the Samsung Galaxy S5 lost half of its value within two months of being released onto the market. The LG G4 depreciated by 88% nine months after its release.在安卓品牌中,HTC One M9推出一个月后就贬值了65%,而三星盖乐世S5在上市两个月后贬值一半。LG G4在推出9个月后贬值88%。In contrast, the iPhone 4 has clung on to 39% of its value five years after its launch in 2010. The iPhone 6 (16GB) has kept 50% of its value a year after being released.相比之下,2010年发布的iPhone 4在上市5年后,仍保有原价值的39%,而16G的iPhone 6在推出一年后保持住了原价值的一半。While the majority of iPhone models don#39;t lose their value as quickly as Android phones, the iPhone 5 is an exception, having seen 66 per cent wiped off its value within eight months of its release date. One reason the research gives for the iPhone 5#39;s rapid depreciation is the iPhone 5s, which was released shortly after the iPhone 5.虽然大多数型号的iPhone手机没有像安卓手机一样那么快地贬值,但是iPhone 5是个例外。在发布8个月之后,这款手机就已经贬值66%了。该项研究给出的iPhone 5快速贬值的原因之一就是因为紧随其后发布的iPhone 5s。Liam Howley, marketing director at musicMagpie, told This is Money: #39;After the initial loss in value, which was different for all models and makes, all the phones we researched seemed to lose value at a consistent average rate of 1 per cent a month after then.#39;musicMagpie网站市场主管利亚姆·豪利接受《This is Money》采访时表示:“视手机型号和品牌有所不同,在经历过最初的贬值后,我们研究的所有手机,基本上贬值的平均速度都为1%。” /201607/452813德清县臀部吸脂多少钱

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湖州福音医院口腔科In the past few weeks something we always knew to be true, but which we preferred to overlook for convenience’s sake, is proving harder to ignore. 过去几周,我们一直都知道是怎么回事、但为了省事而不去深究的某些事情,变得更难忽视了。The fact is that digital services are not free, they never were and that any entity from Silicon Valley that ever claimed they could be did so only because it suited their agenda or that of someone else.事实是,数字务并非免费,它们从未免费过,硅谷任何声称能够提供免费数字务的公司之所以那么说,只是因为这话符合它们或其他什么人的利益。Think of all the free digital services you use every day without paying a penny: email, travel apps, social media, YouTube, search, Wikipedia. 想想我们每天不花一分钱就可以使用的所有免费数字务:电子邮件、旅行应用、社交媒体,YouTube、搜索、维基百科(Wikipedia)。If you had to pay for all of them, how many would you use?如果要为所有这些务付费,你还会使用多少?This revelation is not the result of a crash in the share prices of companies providing free internet services. 我们醒悟到这一点并非提供免费互联网务的公司股价暴跌的结果。Nor is it because a plethora of app companies has run out of financing options for their lossmaking operations. 也不是因为众多app开发商的亏损业务的融资选择越来越少。It has hit us because the fake news scandal has led us to question whether the news and information we have been consuming online for nothing was ever being generated in our interests.我们之所以醒悟过来,是因为假新闻丑闻使我们开始怀疑,我们在网上免费消费的新闻和信息,是否以符合我们利益的方式生成?However, the outrage that has followed this realisation — with free services such as Google and Facebook being urged to censor and filter the news — misdiagnoses the situation. 然而,这一认识带来的愤怒——要求谷歌(Google)、Facebook等免费务提供商审查并过滤新闻——是对现实的错误诊断。The right diagnosis is this: over the past 20 years we have normalised a digital economy that funds itself either by appealing to the sort of investors who will tolerate long-term cash burn if the ultimate pay-off is monopoly control or by creating business models that profit from morally ambiguous situations.正确的诊断是:过去20年,我们已经让这样一种数字经济正常化,这种经济通过两种方式募集资金:一是吸引那些愿意为最终获得垄断控制权而忍受长期烧钱的投资者,二是创建能够获利于道德上模糊的情况的业务模式。Where traditional media institutions feared to t with advertising-funded models because of a belief in editorial responsibility, balance and context, social media platforms — free from any industry codes of conduct — moved right in. 传统媒体机构基于对采编责任、平衡与大背景的考虑,不敢随便引入广告赞助模式,这恰好让不受任何行业行为准则约束的社交媒体平台趁虚而入。The lines between editorial, advertising, entertainment and political propaganda became entirely blurred in the quest for clicks.为了追求点击率,编辑、广告、以及政治宣传之间的界线变得完全模糊了。The growing cyber-industrial complex has normalised this further, with cross-subsidisation models that gouge wealthier customer segments for the benefit of non-paying ones referred to euphemistically as ecosystems. 日益壮大的网络工业复合体使这种状况进一步常态化,它们搞出交叉补贴模式——向较富裕客户群体收取较高费用,以补贴非付费客户——还美其名曰生态系统。An ecosystem, in case you do not know, is a state of mutual co-dependence between organisms, often where one organism has to submit to the other in order to achieve balance.一个生态系统(如果你不知道这个)是不同有机体相互依存的一种状态,往往其中一个有机体必须屈从于另一个,才能保持平衡。None of this is new. 这一切都并非新鲜事物。The last time a country normalised a complex web of interdependencies, it was called Gosplan. 上一次一个国家让一个复杂的相互依存网络常态化,还是苏联国家计划委员会(Gosplan)时代的事情。Just like today’s internet economy, this Soviet system was based on the idea that a technocratic and scientific central planning process could justly punish some to the benefit of others.正如当下的互联网经济一样,苏联这一体制基于的理念是,某种技术官僚的、科学的中央规划过程,可以理直气壮地为了造福于某些人而惩罚另一些人。And, like today’s internet economy, it normalised the false idea that scientific progress could cultivate a cornucopia of free resources with no associated costs or losses of freedom.也像当下的互联网经济一样,它让一种错误理念正常化:即科学进步可以培养一种免费资源的聚宝盆,而不会有相关成本,也不会失去自由。That fallacy ended abruptly in 1985. 这种谬误在1985年轰然倒塌。A spate of economic crises, consumer shortages and regional instabilities, including the re-emergence of nationalistic sentiments, revealed that the centralised, cross-subsidised economy of the Soviet Union was bankrupt and had to be reformed.当时一连串经济危机、消费品短缺及地区不稳定(包括再度高涨的民族主义情绪)揭示出,中央集权、交叉补贴的苏联经济模式已经破产,不得不进行改革。What followed was the era of perestroika and glasnost, meaning restructuring and openness respectively. 随之到来的是改革(perestroika)和开放(glasnost)的时代。By that point, however, it was too late to save the Soviet system. 然而,那时要挽救苏联体制已经太晚。Its internal imbalances had become too large. 其内部失衡过于严重。In 1991, the USSR collapsed under the weight of its own failing economy.1991年,苏联在经济每况愈下的重压下解体。Yet, in the wake of that collapse, something else happened. 但在苏联解体后,又出现了新情况。The removal of subsidies from those who had grown so hopelessly dependent on the system that they could not fend for themselves outside it led to a backlash. 对于那些已经无可救药地依赖于苏联体制、没有这个体制就无法养活自己的人,取消补贴引发了强烈抵制。Many yearned for the return of the old system, no matter the totalitarian cost. 许多人渴望回归旧体制,无论极权政权的代价有多高。Political freedom, it turned out, was in some cases just too costly.事实明,有时候政治自由的代价实在太大。Imagine what the outcome would be if the digital economy experienced a similar adjustment.想象一下,如果数字经济经历类似的调整,会有什么样的结局。 /201611/479998 湖州曙光整形美容医院激光祛痘好吗湖州中心医院减肥手术多少钱




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